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Abstract
Who pays for immigration control? According to the Lisbon Treaty the cost of enforcing
the European border against illegal immigration shall be shared among the EU
members. Nonetheless, the Treaty is vague with respect to the “appropriate measures”
to adopt in order to distribute the financial burden. Members who do not share their
borders with source countries have an incentive to free ride on the other countries. We
study a novel contribution game in which a border country and a central country
minimize a loss function with respect to their national immigration target. We consider
both sequential and simultaneous decisions and we show that joint contribution occurs
only if the immigration targets are not too different. Total contribution is higher in the
simultaneous game, but the sequential framework reduces the incentive to free ride.
Jel codes: D78, H72, H77
Keywords: Policy making; Government expenditures; Local government
expenditures; Federalism
1 Introduction
The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and the Tampere Meeting in 1999 have been early
attempts to lay out the foundations of a common EU immigration and asylum policy.
More recently, the Lisbon Treaty calls for the fair sharing of the financial burden neces-
sary for border control and for the development of a European border surveillance system
(Eurosur) (articles no. 77 and 80).
In spite of these aspirations, results have been deceiving: member states still control the
most important aspects of immigration policy, and the Constitutional Treaty reiterates
the right of the EU members to determine national immigration quotas (article III-267
(5)).1
So far, the main attempt to move immigration control to a supranational level has been
the establishment of the Frontex agency in 2005. The intent of Frontex is coordinating
the national immigration policies at the European level, but it is still far from being a
full-fledged authority.
The promotion of a EU immigration policy, the development of Eurosur and the expan-
sion of Frontex will require important financial resources (European Commission 2008;
Jeandesboz 2008).
However, although the Lisbon Treaty states that the cost of implementing UE policies
“shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between
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the Member States”2, it does not provide any rule on how to share these costs in practice,
nor does it regulate the institutional framework in which the funds have to be gathered.
According to Schain (2010), this is the key indication of the failure of immigration policy
to take off at the European level.
This paper studies to what extent it is possible to implement a EU immigration policy
when the member states interact in the absence of a regulator.
The literature on this issue is still in its beginning, even though authors concerned
with the analysis of asylum policies have addressed similar problems: they have stressed
the cross-country spillovers caused by refugees entitled to free mobility within a feder-
ation, and they have studied the welfare effects of a coordinated policy. This literature
is in fact particularly interested in studying the gains from coordination. For instance,
Hatton (2004) adopts a standard social planner approach, while Facchini et al. (2006)
study the welfare properties of policy coordination in a representative democracy
framework.
However, wemove from a political economy perspective, and our work is mainly related
to two contributions: Mayr et al. (2011) and Haake et al. (2010). The first article studies
the joint funding of immigration restriction when a border country may legalize illegal
immigrants who are then entitled to move to an interior country. Still, the analysis is
limited to the consequences of an immigration amnesty.
The second article proposes a mechanism-design approach in order to redistribute
resources for immigration control from northern countries to southern countries3. The
tools provided by mechanism design might be useful in this respect, but the lack of a
federal regulator allowed to tax and redistribute suggests that it is still too early to put
forward such an approach4.
In what follows we investigate the possibility of sharing the cost of external border con-
trol in the framework of the current EU institutions. The simplest method for trying to
achieve this aim would be transferring EU funds to the countries that lie on the external
border of the Union.
In this respect, two crucial points must be emphasized: 1) there is no federal regula-
tor; 2) free mobility in the Schengen area implies that countries enforcing the external
border -i.e. Southern European countries- provide a public good.5
These features are typical of contribution games, which therefore provide a proper
modelling framework for our purposes.6
However, immigration policy has a peculiarity that deserves special attention: immigra-
tion is restricted because the potential supply of foreign workers is overwhelming, and
different countries have different preferences over the number of immigrants to be let in.
In other words, countries have a national immigration target.
Several authors have studied the determination of this target in various theoretical
frameworks. Tomention but a few, the seminal paper by Benhabib (1996) is an example of
median voter models. Facchini and Willmann (2005) adopt a common agency approach.
Mazza and Van Winden (1996), Amegashie (2004), Epstein and Nitzan (2006), Russo
(2011), determine immigration quotas from voting, lobbying and/or bargaining models.
What do these targets imply for the funding of immigration control in a federation?
Not only this issue has not yet been investigated, but it also requires the development of
a specific contribution game, since the possibility of a target has not been explored in the
theoretical literature. We build such a game by observing that deviations from a target
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cause disutility. We capture this point by introducing loss functions in a contribution
game.
In order to clarify our approach, it is important to note that we want to depict a situation
in which national governments try to achieve their own interests in a federal assembly.
For our purposes, therefore, the national targets are exogenously given.7
Our model includes a central country (henceforth C) and a border country
(henceforth B). B shares its border with an emigration country and provides border
enforcement for both countries. Both C and B should contribute to border control, but
they have different immigration targets and contribution cannot be enforced. We believe
that these features fit quite well the current EU situation.
Our procedure brings to light several important results. First of all, we find that the dif-
ference in the national targets is crucial, and it could easily prevent contribution although
information is complete and symmetric. Thus, imperfect information is not the main
obstacle to a European immigration policy.
Then, we compare simultaneous and sequential decisions to check whether there exists
an institutional framework that dominates the others in terms of total contribution or
incentive to contribute. In the sequential case we explore what happens when the leader
is C or B.8
By confronting the alternative regimes we find that:
1) in order to obtain positive contributions, the immigration targets of C and B must
not be too different;
2) the admissible difference in the immigration targets is wider in the sequential game;
3) when both contributions are positive, total contribution is unambiguously higher
in the simultaneous game;
4) equilibrium contributions are Pareto-inefficient;
5) in each game a simple condition determines whether C or B contributes more.
Results 1) and 2) reverse the well-known conclusions in Varian (1994): they show that the
presence of a target incentivizes contribution when preferences are similar and that free
riding is less likely in the sequential game.
With respect to the prospects of a European immigration policy at the current
stage of the integration process, our results suggest that a simultaneous regime, in
which central countries decide jointly with border countries, produces tighter bor-
der enforcement but is more vulnerable to free riding. On the other hand, the
sequential regime provides better incentives to contribute in spite of a smaller total
contribution.
The paper is organized as follows: the next Section introduces our model, Section 3
presents the results when decisions are sequential or simultaneous, Section 4 studies the
effect of the cost asymmetry on the equilibrium contribution, Section 5 is devoted to com-
pare the equilibrium contributions under the different institutional frameworks, Section 6
proves that the equilibrium contributions are Pareto inefficient, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Themodel
Our model has to depict the basic issues related to the European immigration policy we
have discussed in the introduction. First of all, external border enforcement is a public
good, and there exists a conflict over its funding. No supranational authority can enforce
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a scheme of taxes and subsidies, thus countries interact strategically and nobody is forced
to contribute. As a consequence, a contribution game fits very well this situation.
Our players are a central country (C) and a border country (B). B shares its border with
an emigration country and provides immigration control for C as well. Both countries
can contribute to curb immigration, but they have different immigration targets and face
possibly different costs of contributing.
Before introducing our contribution game we have to clarify how immigration control
is obtained.
2.1 Immigration control
Each country would like to halt immigration once its target is achieved. However,
restricting immigration is expensive: it requires resources to enforce the border, screen
immigrants, contrast illegal inflows and so on. A convenient way to summarize these
actions is describing immigration restriction as an output produced through the resources
C and B are willing to spend in order to achieve their targets.
We define with gB and gC the contributions by B and C respectively. LetM be the inflow
of immigrants into the federation, which is given by
M = M¯ − d(gB + gC) 0 < d < 1; (1)
Where M¯ > 0 depicts the inflow into the federation in case of no restriction (i. e. gB =
gC = 0). This kind of “production function” fits the idea that the amount of restriction is
proportional to the resources used.9
2.2 Payoffs
As we have pointed out in the introduction, the peculiarity of immigration control is that
the country’s desired quota acts as a bliss point. Thus, payoffs include a quadratic loss
function with respect to the national target, given by 0 ≤ M∗C < M¯ and 0 ≤ M∗B < M¯
respectively.
Since we are interested in studying how equilibrium contributions are determined, we
consider the targets as exogenously given. In our view, this fits well a situation in which
member countries try to defend their national interests within a federal assembly like the
European Parliament.
We also assume perfect information on the destination chosen by immigrants: both
countries know how many immigrants are willing to settle in C and how many immi-
grants are willing to settle in B. This assumption is by no means restrictive: since mobility
within the federation is unrestrained, it only indicates that C and B know how the popula-
tion inflow is going to be shared. Countries are usually well informed about their relative
attractiveness for the immigrants.
Finally, C and B bear a quadratic cost to collect the resources needed to enforce the
border.10 As a consequence, we write the utilities as follows:






UB = −12 (M − M
∗
B)
2 − π2 g
2
B. (3)
Note that since M is the inflow into the federation, M∗C andM∗B denote the federal target
preferred by C and B respectively.11
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The parameter π ≥ 1 allows for the possibility that the disutility of gathering the
resources needed to curb immigration is relatively higher for B.
π is introduced for sake of generality, because it gives us the opportunity to analyze a
cost asymmetry: in principle, it is quite possible that C and B bear different costs to gather
the same contribution. This might happen, for instance, when B faces a fiscal crisis, as it
is currently the case of Italy and Spain.
By substituting (1) into (2) and (3) we can rewrite the payoffs:






UB = −12 (M¯ − d(gB + gC) − M
∗
B)
2 − π2 g
2
B (5)
We are now going to solve the model under sequential and simultaneous decisions. In
order to avoid redundancies the main properties of the results are discussed at the end of
this section.
2.3 Results: sequential decisions
In the case of sequential decisions, both C and B could have the right to move first. We
are now going to explore both cases.
2.3.1 Cmoves first
Assume for the moment that C is the leader and B is the follower. We solve the game by
backwards induction. The best response of B to C is
g¯B = d(M¯ − M
∗
B) − d2gC
π + d2 . (6)



















C(π + d2)πd − πd3B
π2d2 + (π + d2)2 (7)
where C ≡ (M¯ − M∗C), and B ≡ (M¯ − M∗B) measure the desired entry restriction.
By substituting (7) into (6) we get
g∗B =
B(π + d2 + πd2)d − πd3C
π2d2 + (π + d2)2 (8)
we therefore have obtained the equilibrium contributions of both players when C moves
first.
These contributions are positive under the following conditions:





π + d2 (9)




π + d2 + πd2
πd2 (10)
Since C andB measure the restriction desired by C and B respectively, we define the
ratio C
B
as the “relative restriction” desired by C.




> 1 means that C likes more restriction relative to B. The opposite occurs when
C
B
< 1. Conditions (9) and (10) indicate that for a player to contribute positively his
desired relative restriction must be sufficiently high. This will be crucial in the rest of the
paper.
Now we are going to present the results when B is the leader.
2.3.2 Cmoves second
When Bmoves first, the best response function of C is
g¯C = d(M¯ − M
∗
C) − d2gB
1 + d2 . (11)
In order to solve the leader’s problem, we now substitute the best response function of C
(11) into (5) and we find the equilibrium contribution of B (g∗∗B ). Then, we plug g∗∗B into
(11) and we solve for the follower’s contribution (g∗∗C ).
The equilibrium contributions are
g∗∗C =
C(d2 + π + πd2)d − d3B
d2 + π(1 + d2)2 (12)
g∗∗B =
B(1 + d2)d − d3C
d2 + π(1 + d2)2 . (13)
The conditions for having positive contributions are summarized below:





d2 + π + πd2 (14)






Finally, we are going to solve the simultaneous game.
2.4 Results: simultaneous decisions
In a simultaneous game, the best response functions for C and B are, respectively, (11)
and (6), and the solutions are
g˜C = C(π + d
2)d − d3B
d2 + π + πd2 (16)
g˜B = B(1 + d
2)d − d3C
d2 + π + πd2 . (17)
These contributions are positive under the following conditions:





d2 + π (18)






By observing (7), (8), (12), (13), (16) and (17) it is evident that the equilibrium contribution
of each player is decreasing with respect to the desired immigration restriction of the
other player. In other words, in all cases the contribution of C is decreasing with B, and
the contribution of B is decreasing with C .
To understand intuitively this result, suppose then that B prefers strict border enforce-
ment andC is relatively open. As a consequence the ratio C
B
is low, andC has an incentive
to free ride, because B will provide enough immigration control for both countries. This
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conveys the essential insight that, in order for both countries to contribute, the national
targetsM∗C andM∗B must not be too different. This result extends earlier findings by Var-
ian (1994)12, and it has crucial consequences that we are going to discuss in the rest of the
paper.
Before proceeding to compare the outcomes under the sequential and the simultaneous
regimes, it is indispensable to understand when contributions are positive and when there
exists joint contribution.
3 Conditions for joint contribution
Wedefine “joint contribution” a situation in which both contributions are positive in equi-
librium. We know that individual equilibrium contributions are positive when conditions
(9), (10), (14), (15), (18) and (19) hold. The cut-off values of C
B
are ordered in Figure 1,
and the intervals of C
B
under which both contributions are positive in the different games







Figure 1 Positivity conditions for the equilibrium contributions.
By simple inspection of these conditions we can write the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (Conditions for joint contribution): joint contribution occurs if and only
if the individual immigration targets are not too different. The admissible difference is
broader in the sequential game.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition is crucial because it points out that in a sequential framework the
range of C
B
under which there exists joint contribution is wider compared to the simul-
taneous framework (see Figure 1). In this respect, our results depart from Varian (1994),
who argues that sequentiality can exacerbate free riding problems: in Varian a leader with
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higher marginal utility from the public good might be better off by not contributing and
free riding on the follower.
In our model this result is reversed because a player does not contribute only when the
other player’s contribution is sufficient to saturate his utility. This occurs only when the
players have very different targets.
In a sequential game with close targets the follower’s contribution is not sufficient to
put the leader on his bliss point, so the leader has no incentive to free ride.
As a consequence, the only way to exploit the leadership is trying to set the contribution
at a level that does not satisfy the follower and pushes him to add his own contribution.
4 The role of the cost asymmetry
In this section we report some comparative statics results with respect to the effect of the
cost asymmetry π . For simplicity we only show the case in which B bears higher costs.
The results are obviously symmetric when C bears higher costs.
In the Appendix we show that, quite intuitively, B reduces his equilibrium contribution
as π increases. On the other hand, the equilibrium contribution of C increases with π in
all cases, provided that joint contribution occurs. Results are summarized in the following
table:
sequential

























< 0 for C
B
< 1+d2d2
The most important outcome of this comparative statics analysis is that when there
is joint contribution the timing of the game does not determine the effect of π on the
equilibrium contributions.
What matters is the decision to contribute: once C decides to put resources in immigra-
tion control, he is going to increase his equilibrium contribution as B faces higher costs in
gathering his own contribution. To understand the reason of this behavior it is important
to remember that this holds when both contributions are positive, i.e. when the targets
of C and B are sufficiently close. In such a case, C finds it convenient to increase his
equilibrium contribution in order to compensate the possible disadvantage of B.
5 Sequential vs. simultaneous decisions
5.1 Total contribution
In this section we restrict our attention to the case of joint contribution. By comparing
the equilibrium solution in the three cases, it is straightforward to conclude that total
contribution is higher in the simultaneous regime. This is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. (Comparison of total contributions): when joint contribution occurs,
total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game than in the sequential one.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition simply states that the simultaneous game dominates the sequential
game in terms of total contribution -no matter who is the leader-. This happens because
when themoves are simultaneous there is no first-mover advantage, and the leader cannot
push the follower to contribute in its stead. Unlike Proposition 1, this result is in line with
Varian (1994), who shows that in a game with complete information total contribution is
never larger in the sequential framework.13
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 convey our most important result, namely that the
simultaneous game increases total contribution, but it requires more stringent conditions
in order to get positive contributions from both players.
In other words, the simultaneous framework is successful in increasing total con-
tribution given that countries are willing to contribute, while the sequential frame-
work is successful in inducing contribution. It follows that the sequential game
should be recommended when the immigration targets of C and B are very dif-
ferent and the main issue is to provide an incentive to contribute. This seems to
be the case of the EU, therefore an effort to frame a federal immigration policy
at the current stage of the European integration should favor sequential funding
decisions.
In addition, we must stress that the simplest attempt to obtain some contribution from
a reluctant country is to make it act as a follower in the sequential game. In fact, from
Proposition 1 we know that the leader tries to set his own contribution at a level that
encourages the follower to contribute as well. This widens the range of C
B
allowing a
positive contribution (see Figure 1).
5.2 Individual contribution
We now compare the individual contributions within the different regimes in the case of
joint contribution.
Our first conclusion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. (Equilibrium contributions in the sequential game): in the sequential
game the leader contributes more than the follower when C
B
> π+d2+2πd2





Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand the meaning of this proposition, consider the case ofC leader, and notice
that the cut-off value of C
B
is π+d2+2πd2
π+2πd2 > 1. This means that for the leader to contribute
more than the follower his desired relative restriction must be sufficiently high14.
This happens because he exploits the information on the follower’s target. Thus in our
game the first mover advantage has two aspects: 1) the leader can push the follower to
contribute (proposition 1); 2) the leader can reduce his own contribution as the follower
has a stronger taste for restriction.
The comparison of the individual contributions in the simultaneous game is reported
in the next proposition:
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Proposition 4. (Equilibrium contributions in the simultaneous game): in the simultane-




Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand intuitively the meaning of this proposition, notice that when costs are
symmetric (i.e. π = 1) the condition C
B
> 1+2d2
π+2d2 boils down to C > B. Hence, when
the cost of gathering the resources for immigration control is the same, the country who
desires more restriction contributes more. When π is larger than unity this condition is











In other words, C observes that B bears a higher cost, and, if π is sufficiently high, C is
going to contribute more than B even though C < B15.
6 Efficiency
We now address the issue of Pareto Efficiency. We define the social welfare W as the
weighted sum of the utilities (2) and (3):
W = −α2
[
(M − M∗C)2 + g2C
] − (1 − α)2
[
(M − M∗B)2 + πg2B
]
, (20)
where 0 < α < 1 and (1 − α) are the weights that the social planner assigns to C and B
respectively. The weights may mirror, for instance, the relative size of the two countries in
the federation. Since the outcome is clearly inefficient when a player free rides, we focus
our attention on the case of joint contribution. Then, it is straightforward to prove the
following proposition:
Proposition 5. (Pareto efficiency): the equilibrium contributions are efficient if and only
if (1 − α)πg∗B = αg∗C.
Proof. See the Appendix.
According to this condition, the marginal cost borne by each country should be
weighted for its weight in the federation. Inefficiency arises when a planner can increase
the social welfare by reallocating some contribution towards the country with the lower
social marginal cost.




= α1−α . Since the players do not
internalize the social weights α and (1 − α), there is no reason why in the decentralized
equilibrium the ratio of the marginal costs should equal α1−α . Thus, we conclude that the
decentralized equilibrium is generally Pareto inefficient.
7 Conclusions
The strikingly simple model we have developed has novel and unexpected implications
for framing a European immigration policy.
First of all, we bring to light that joint contribution occurs only if the national immigra-
tion targets are not too different. Therefore, the real root of the free riding problem lies
in the heterogeneity of the national targets rather than in imperfect information. This is
even more worrying because it implies that improving information will not help to avoid
free riding.
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On the other hand, in contrast to Varian (1994), we uncover that the free riding problem
is reduced in a sequential framework. Thus, when the federation members are hetero-
geneous and free riding is pervasive, sequential decisions should be definitely preferred.
Since this case seems closer to the current EU situation, our model suggests to adopt a
sequential contribution scheme in which border countries are the leader.
In addition, according to our results, once joint contribution is achieved central coun-
tries compensate to some extent the possible lack of resources of border countries.16
This fosters the idea that securing joint contribution should be the top priority for EU
policymakers.
Thus, in the wait for a full-fledged federal immigration authority, our analysis provides
a feasible roadmap to implement to some extent article no. 80 of the Lisbon Treaty.
Endnotes
1The emigration wave due to the Arab Spring has produced pressures to reintroduce
internal border checks rather than promoting a European immigration policy. In April
2011 French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi sent
a joint letter to the European Commission and the European Council, requesting EU to
“review the possibility of temporarily restoring controls at international borders” in the
Schengen area.
2Article no. 80.
3Haake et al. (2010) propose the adoption of the expected externality mechanism,
where a supranational authority asks each country its own marginal willingness to pay for
the public good, then countries are taxed and provided with the public good according
to the revealed information. Unfortunately, this mechanism does not always satisfy the
participation constraints.
4In addition, mechanisms are especially used to deal with informational asymmetries
(see Clarke, 1971; Arrow, 1979; d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet, 1979) while contribution
games show that free riding can occur under perfect information.
5Northern members of the EU seem indeed reluctant to contribute to enforce the
border in the South (Wolff, 2008).
6Note also that Frontex is funded through a subsidy of the EU plus “a contribution
from the countries associated with the implementation, application and development of
the Schengen acquis” and “any voluntary contribution from the Member States” (Official
Journal of the EU, 25-11-2004, L 349/9).
7According to the literature quoted above, the target is determined by the interaction of
different interest groups rather than by a benevolent social planner. As a consequence, it
should not be intended as a social optimum. Deviations are costly because they represent
a diversion from the national target, no matter how it has been determined.
8A great deal of literature studies joint provision of public goods within a sequential
or simultaneous game (see for example Warr, 1982 and 1983; Cornes and Sandler, 1984;
Bergstrom et al., 1986; Varian, 1994). With respect to the funding of border control, Mayr
et al. (2011) only consider simultaneous decisions. They do not study what happens when
a country can exploit the advantage of being the first mover.
9Linearity of eq. (1) is useful in order to get straightforward closed-form solutions. We
have tested the robustness of our model by using a strictly concave form of (1). In such
a case, when closed-form solutions are still available, the results reported in Proposition
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1 continue to hold in spite of substantial complications. In the absence of closed-form
solutions, it is easy to get similar outcomes from numerical simulations. This supports the
intuition that our results are due to the presence of a target rather than to the functional
form of (1), thus we have preferred to preserve simplicity.
10Gathering real resources always generates costs: they can be the political costs of
raising taxes, or even the opportunity costs of diverting funds from alternative projects.
11This is not an issue because free mobility and perfect information on the destination
chosen by the immigrants imply that any national target uniquely defines a federal target.
An example clarifies this point: suppose that one half immigrants settle in C and the other
half settle in B. If C wants 100 immigrants, it follows that 200 should be admitted into the
federation, thus its target will beM∗C = 200.
12Russo and Senatore (2012) provide the theoretical framework of a contribution game
with loss functions and a thorough comparison with Varian (1994). They suggest several
cases that involve the joint production of a public good in the presence of targets.
13We also have (g∗C + g∗L) ≥ (g∗∗C + g∗∗L ) when CL ≤ π(1+d
2)+d2(2+d2)
π(1+2d2)+d2(1+d2) . There are no
particular reasons why this condition should hold, thus we conclude that it is not possible
to know a priori whether total contribution is higher when C or L is the leader. Note
however that the right-hand side is smaller than unity.
14Obviously the same occurs in the case of L leader, when 1+2d2
πL+πLd2+2d2 < 1 implies that
the relative restriction desired by L is sufficiently high.
15This outcome is consistent with the comparative statics results presented in the pre-






16Besides, according to our efficiency analyis, as far as border countries are aminority of
the federation, increasing the contribution of central countries can increase social welfare.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In the simultaneous game there is joint contribution when
d2






In the sequential game when C is the leader there is joint contribution when
d2








d2 , it follows that the interval of
C
B
under which joint contribution
occurs is wider in the sequential game.
In the sequential game when B is the leader there is joint contribution when
d2








π+d2 , it follows that the interval of
C
B
under which joint contribution
occurs is wider in the sequential game.
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Proof of Proposition 2
We want to prove that total contribution in the simultaneous framework (g˜C + g˜B) dom-
inates total contribution in the sequential framework (g∗C + g∗B and g∗∗C + g∗∗B ). Thus, we
have to verify that
d(πC + B)
π + d2 + πd2︸ ︷︷ ︸
simultaneous
>
d(π2C + B(π + d2))
π2d2 + (π + d2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
sequential, C leader
(24)





π + d2 .
When B is the leader we have.
d(πC + B)
π + d2 + πd2︸ ︷︷ ︸
simultaneous
>
dC(π + πd2) + dB
d2 + π(1 + d2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
sequential, B leader
(25)






we conclude that total contribution in the simultaneous framework dominates total con-








(B leader). However, these conditions coincide with the values of C
B
assuring joint contri-
bution in the simultaneous framework. Thus we conclude that when both contributions
are positive, total contribution in the simultaneous game dominates total contribution in
the sequential game.
Proof of Proposition 3
We want to prove when the leader contributes more than the follower. When C is the
leader, the condition g∗C ≥ g∗B is
C(π + d2)πd − πd3B
π2d2 + (π + d2)2 ≥
B(π + d2 + πd2)d − πd3C
π2d2 + (π + d2)2 (26)
by rearranging condition (26) we obtain
C
B
≥ π + d
2 + 2πd2
π + 2πd2 .
With B leader, we set g∗∗B ≥ g∗∗C :
B(1 + d2)d − d3C
d2 + π(1 + d2)2 ≥
C(d2 + π + πd2)d − d3B
d2 + π(1 + d2)2 . (27)
By rearranging condition (27) we obtain
C
B
≤ 1 + 2d
2
π + πd2 + 2d2 .
Since
d2
π + d2 <
π + d2 + 2πd2
π + 2πd2 <
πd2 + d2 + π
πd2
and
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d2
d2 + π + πd2 <
1 + 2d2
π + πd2 + 2d2 <
1 + d2
d2
we conclude that proposition 3 holds when there is joint contribution.
Proof of Proposition 4
To compare the individual contributions in the simultaneous game, we set g˜C ≥ g˜B, i.e.
C(π + d2)d − d3B
d2 + π + πd2 ≥
B(1 + d2)d − d3C
d2 + π + πd2 . (28)
By rearranging condition (28) we obtain
C
B
≥ π + 2d
2
1 + 2d2 .




2 + π + πd2) − (1 + d2)(C(π + d2)d − d3B)




5C(d2 + 2π) + 2d3πB(πd2 + π + d2)








< 0 for C
B
≤ (π + d
2 + πd2)2 − d6
π2d2(1 + d2) − d6




(π + d2 + πd2)
πd2 <
(π + d2 + πd2)2 − d6
π2d2(1 + d2) − d6




< 0 when both contributions are positive.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the social welfare function (20):
W = −α2
[
(M − M∗C)2 + g2C
] − (1 − α)2
[
(M − M∗B)2 + πg2B
]
.
The total differential of (20) with respect to gC and gB is
dW = −α2
[−2d (C − d(gC + gB))] (dgC + dgB)+
− (1 − α)2
[−2d (B − d(gC + gB))] (dgC + dgB) − [αgCdgC + (1 − α) πgBdgB]
Suppose now that total contribution (gC + gB) is kept constant, while some contribution
is reallocated between C and B. In such a case we have
dgC + dgB = 0
by substituting dgB = −dgC the differential dW boils down to
dW = dgC
[





(1 − α)πgB > αgC
]
, a reallocation dgC > 0 increases the social welfare. When[
(1 − α)πgB < αgC
]
, a reallocation dgC < 0 increases the social welfare.
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Equality of the weighted marginal costs implies that the more populated country has to
increase its contribution because it benefits more from immigration restriction.
In other words, efficiency implies
(1 − α)πg∗B = αg∗C .
Since the players do not condider the weight α, there is no reason why the decentral-
ized equilibrium should produce such an outcome. We conclude that the equilibrium is
generally inefficient.
A particular case arises when α = 1/2, i.e. whenC and B are equal in size. In such a case,
Pareto efficiency requires the equality of the marginal costs and, to to prove inefficiency,
we only have to compare these costs in equilibrium. In the sequential game with C leader
we have to set (πg∗B − g∗C) > 0, i. e.
π
(
B(π + d2 + πd2)d − πd3C
π2d2 + (π + d2)2
)
>
C(π + d2)πd − πd3B





π + πd2 + 2d2
π + d2 + πd2
since joint contribution occurs in the interval
d2








d2 + π + πd2 <
π + πd2 + 2d2
π + d2 + πd2 <
d2 + π + πd2
d2
we conclude that




π + πd2 + 2d2
π + d2 + πd2
(πg∗B − g∗C) ≥ 0 for
C
B
≤ π + πd
2 + 2d2
π + d2 + πd2 .






= π + d
2 + πd2
π + d2 + 2πd2
In this case too, it is easy to check that the critical value of C
B
lies in the interval of joint
contribution:
d2
d2 + π + πd2 <
π + d2 + πd2
π + d2 + 2πd2 <
1 + d2
d2 .




It is straightforward to verify that 1 lies in the interval of joint contribution:
d2
d2 + π < 1 <
1 + d2
d2 .
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